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Privatization of Corrections:
Defining the Issues*
Ira P. Robbins**
Although something must be done about the sordid state of our nation's
prisons and jails, we should not permit the purported benefits of privatization to thwart considerationof the broad, difficult policy questions that are
involved.

Even as the public is demanding that more criminals be incarcerated and that their sentences be lengthened, the problems of
America's prisons and jails continue to plague, if not overwhelm,
us. More than two-thirds of the states are currently under court
order to correct conditions that violate the United States ConstituThis article is reprinted from 69 JUDICATURE 325-31 (1986).
The author is Barnard T. Welsh, Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, The
American University, Washington College of Law.
This article is adapted from testimony that I presented before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 99th, Congress 1st Session, Nov. 13, 1985.
The reader should be aware that I served as the Reporter on Legal Issues for the National Institute of Justice's National Forum on "Corrections and the Private Sector" (Feb.
1985) and am currently serving as Reporter for the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's study on the privatization of corrections. Although the analyses, conclusions,
and points of view expressed herein are my own, and do not reflect the positions of the
Federal Judicial Center or the National Institute of Justice, a slightly modified version of
this paper served as the Report that accompanied a Resolution presented by the ABA Criminal Justice Section to the ABA House of Delegates, recommending that "jurisdictions that
are considering the privatization of prisons and jails not proceed . . . until the complex
constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues are satisfactorily developed and resolved."
The Resolution was passed by the House of Delegates at its February 1986 meeting.
*

**
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tion's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. There are
many important questions, but there are still no clear, satisfactory
answers.
The last few years have thus witnessed diverse, controversial
developments. Some, like the voluntary accreditation of correctional facilities by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, have begun to take root. Others, like a 1982 proposal in Congress to build an Arctic penitentiary for serious offenders, 1 have
been inconsequential. Yet the number of prisons and the cost of
housing them still mount. Prison and jail populations have doubled
in a decade, and-with preventive detention, mandatory-minimum
sentences, habitual-offender statutes, and the abolition of parole in
some jurisdictions-there is no relief in sight. Some states are even
leasing or purchasing space in other states. And it is costing the
taxpayers approximately $17 million a day to operate the facilities,
with estimates ranging up to $60 a day per inmate. Several commentators have not so facetiously noted that we could finance college educations at less cost for all of the inmates in the country.
To reduce some of this stress on the system, a new concept has
emerged: the privatization of corrections, occasionally known as
"prisons for profit." The idea is to remove the operation (and
sometimes the ownership) of an institution from the local, state, or
federal government and turn it over to a private corporation.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that private prisons are
different from the notion of private industries in prison-Chief
Justice Burger's "factories with fences" proposal2-which seeks to
turn prisoners into productive members of society by having them
work at a decent wage and produce products or perform services
that can be sold in the marketplace. (In the process, the prisoners
can also pay some of the costs of their incarceration, and, we would
hope, gain some self-esteem.)
Privatization is also different from the situation in which some
of the services of a facility-such as medical, food, educational, or
vocational services-are operated by private industry. Rather, the
developing idea, which may turn out to be a lasting force or just a
passing fad, is to have the government contract with a private
1. See H.R. 7112, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ("Arctic Penitentiary Act of 1982") (in-

troduced by Rep. Leboutillier).
2. Keynote Address by Warren E. Burger, National Conference on "Factories with
Fences": The Prison Industries Approach to Correctional Dilemmas (June 18, 1984), reprinted in Robbins, ed., PRISONERS AND THE LAW ch. 21 (New York, N.Y.: Clark Boardman,
1985).
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company to run the total institution.
ADVANTAGES AND CRITICISMS

Privatization has sparked a major debate. Its proponents-including not only some corrections professionals, but also
major financial brokers who are advising investors to consider putting their money into private prisons-argue that the government
has been doing a dismal job in its administration of correctional
institutions. Costs have soared, prisoners are coming out worse off
than when they went in, and while they are in they are kept in
conditions that shock the conscience, if not the stomach.
The private sector, advocates claim, can save the taxpayers
money. It can build facilities faster and cheaper, and it can operate
them more economically and more efficiently. With maximum flexibility and little or no bureaucracy, both new ideas (like testing
new philosophies) and routine matters (like hiring new staff) can
be implemented quickly. Overcrowding-perhaps the major problem of corrections today-can be reduced.
A final-and significant-anticipated benefit of privatization
is decreased liability of the government in lawsuits that are
brought by inmates and prison employees.
The critics respond on many fronts, beginning with two major
constitutional objections: the mere fact that the government would
no longer directly be operating the institutions cannot shift liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant
to which most prison-condition litigation is brought; and, in any
event, the government does not have the power to delegate to private entities the authority for such a traditional and important
governmental function. In brief, critics argue that, to be properly
acountable, the government must operate its prisons and jails and
be subject to liability.
As a policy matter, moreover, they claim that it is inappropriate to operate prisons with a profit motive, which provides no incentive to reduce overcrowding (especially if the company is paid
on a per-prisoner basis), nor to consider alternatives to incarceration, nor to deal with the broader problems of criminal justice. On
the contrary, the critics assert that the incentive would be to build
more prisons and jails. And if they are built, we will fill them. This
is a fact of correctional life: The number of jailed criminals has
always risen to fill whatever space is available.
Cost-cutting measures will run rampant. Conditions of confinement will be kept to the minimum that the law requires. As a
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reporter for Barron'shas written: "[T]he brokers, architects, builders and banks ... will make out like bandits."' 3 But questions concerning people's freedom should not be contracted out to the lowest bidder. In short, the private sector is more interested in doing
well than in doing good. This idea was succinctly expressed recently by the director of program development of Triad America
Corporation, a multimillion-dollar Utah-based company that has
been considering proposing a privately run county jail in Missoula,
Montana: "We'll hopefully make a buck at it. I'm not going to'4 kid
any of you and say we are in this for humanitarian reasons."
Privatization also raises concerns about the routine, quasi-judicial decisions that affect the legal status and well-being of the
inmates. To what extent, for example, should a private-corporation
employee be allowed to use force-perhaps serious or deadly
force-against a prisoner? It is difficult enough to control violence
in the present public-correctional system. It will be much more difficult to assure that violence is administered only to the extent required by circumstances when the state relinquishes direct responsibility. Another important concern is whether a private employee
should be entitled to make recommendations to parole boards, or
to bring charges against a prisoner for an institutional violation,
possibly resulting in the forfeiture of good-time credits toward release. With dispersion of accountability, the possibility for vindictiveness increases. As an employee who is now in charge of reviewing disciplinary cases at a privately run Immigration and
Naturalization Service facility in Houston told
a New York Times
'5
reporter last year: "I'm the Supreme Court."
Finally, the critics claim, the financing arrangements for constructing private facilities improperly eliminate the public from
the decisionmaking process. Traditionally, correctional facilities
have been financed through tax-exempt general-obligation bonds
that are backed by the tax revenues of the issuing governmental
body. This debt requires voter approval. Privatization abrogates
this power of the people. In Jefferson County, Colorado, for example, the voters twice rejected a jail-bond issue before E.F. Hutton
underwrote a $30 million issue for private-jail construction. The
3. Duffy, Breaking Into Jail, BARRON'S, May 14, 1984, at 20, 22.
4. Deseret News, June 20-21, 1985, at B7 (statement of Jack Lyman); see also infra n.
50.
5. NEw YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15 (statement of Corrections Corporation of
America employee John Robinson).
6. Rosenberg, Who Says Crime Doesn't Pay?, JERICHO, Spring 1984, at 1, 4; see also
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corporation can build the institution and the government can lease
it. The cost of the facility then comes out of the government's appropriation, avoiding the politically difficult step of raising debt
ceilings. Once the lease payments have fulfilled the debt, ownership of the facility shifts to the governmental body.7 This position
was acknowledged by Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), s who
proposed a bill in 1984 to provide federal investment and rehabilitation tax credits and accelerated-depreciation deductions for private-prison construction.9
One example of the potentially egregious effects of reducing
accountability and regulation concerns a proposal by a private firm
in Pennsylvania to build a 720-bed medium-and maximum-security interstate protective-custody facility on a toxic-waste site,
which it had purchased for $1. The spokesperson for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is reported to have said: "If it
were a state facility, we certainly would be concerned about the
grounds where the facility is located. [As for a private prison,
there] is nothing in our legislation which gives anyone authority on
what to do."10 In the face of proposed legislation in Pennsylvania
to place a one-year moratorium on the construction or operation of
private prisons, the company has since abandoned its plan. It reportedly is now attempting to sell the toxic-waste site for $790,000,
and is seeking to open the protective-custody facility in Idaho.1"
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The relative advantages and disadvantages of privatization are
not merely academic, for more than 30 institutions-immigration,
juvenile, work-release, and halfway-house facilities-are now
owned and operated by private groups. Further, a few of the above
National Institute of Justice, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS 45 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985).
7. See National Institute of Justice, supra n. 6, at 40-50.
8. See NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 17, 1985, at A29.
9. See S. 2933, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ("Prison Consturction Privatization Act of
1984"). Senator D'Amato has stated that, although he supports the private ownership of
prisons, he does not support their private operation. See NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 17, 1985, at
A29.
10. Levine, Private Prison Planned on Toxic Waste Site, NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT
JOURNAL, Fall 1985, at 10, 11.
11. See Elvin, Private Prison Plans Dropped by Buckingham, NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT JOURNAL, Winter 1985, at 11. On March 21, 1986, Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh signed a bill imposing a 15-month moratorium on private prisons, to allow a panel to
study the issues. See NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 23, 1986, at 16; NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 20,
1986, at A22.
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issues have preliminarily been litigated.
There are two major constitutional questions regarding the
privatization of corrections: whether the acts of a private entity
operating a correctional institution constitute "state action," thus
allowing for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and whether, in any
event, delegation of the corrections function to a private entity is
itself constitutional. In this section, I shall address the caselaw pertaining to these questions.
State Action. When a private party, as compared with a government employee, is charged with abridging rights guaranteed by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, the plaintiff, in order to
prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, must show that the private party
was acting "under color of state law." The reason for this is fundamental. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit
the government from denying federal constitutional rights and
which guarantee due process of law, apply to the acts of the state
and the federal governments, and not to the acts of private parties
or entities. 2
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject
to suit for violation of an individual's constitutional rights is
whether "the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] 'fairly attributable to the State.' "113 A person acts under color of state law
"only when exercising 'power possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'""
15
Three basic tests have been used to determine "state action":
the public-function test; the close-nexus test; and the state-compulsion test. State action will be held to exist if any one of these
tests is satisfied. I believe that, in the private-prison context, each
of these tests for state action is satisfied.
12. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11

(1883).
13. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The Supreme Court in Lugar found state action when state
officers had acted jointly with a private creditor to secure the plaintiff's property by garnishment and prejudgment attachment.
14. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
15. The constitutional standard for finding state action is identical to the statutory
standard for determining "color of state law." See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 929 (1982).

1987]

DEFINING THE ISSUES

819

Public-Function test. The case that is perhaps most directly relevant to state action in the private-prison context is Medina v.
O'Neill.1 Sixteen inmates of the privately run Houston Immigration and Naturalization Service facility who had been confined in a
single, windowless, 12-by-20-foot cell that was designed to hold six
persons sued the private corporation and the INS. Another issue in
the case was that one private security guard, who had not been
trained in the use of firearms, had been using a shotgun as a cattle
prod when the gun went off, killing one inmate and seriously
wounding another.
The plaintiffs claimed that they had been unconstitutionally
deprived of life and liberty, arguing, inter alia, that the INS had a
duty to oversee their detention and that the defendant's failure to
do so constituted state action. In opposition, the federal defendants contended that at all times the plaintiffs were in the custody
of the private company, and, therefore, that the problems stemming from the plaintiffs' detention arose from purely private acts.
Thus, the defendants averred that there was no state action.
The federal district court, in 1984, rejected the defendants' argument, finding "obvious state acton" on the part of both the federal defendants and the private company. 17 The court noted that,
although there was no precise formula for defining state action,18
the Supreme Court has recognized a "public function" concept,
which provides that state action exists when the state delegates to
private parties a power "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State." 9 As the Supreme Court stated in 1982 in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn,2" "the relevant question is not simply whether a private
group is serving a 'public function'. . ., [but] whether the function
performed has been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State.' ,,21 The Medina court found that detention came squarely
within this test.
More recently, in August 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc.,22 addressed the question whether a private entity that
16. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
17. Id. at 1038.
18. See Burton v. Wilmington Park Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
19. Flagg Bros., Inc. v Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).

20. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
21.
22.

Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985).
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was responsible for providing medical care to county jail inmates
was liable, under section 1983, to the estate of a deceased countyjail prisoner who, following recalcitrance and improper diagnosis
and treatment by doctors of the private health service, was diagnosed as having leukemia. Finding the state action issue so well
settled as not to require extended discussion, the unanimous court
of appeals panel stated:
Although Prison Health Services and its employees are not strictly speaking
public employees, state action is clearly present. Where a function which is
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state2 (or here, county) is performed by a private entity, state action is present. '

Close-nexus test. Another standard that enlightens state-action jurisprudence is the "close-nexus" test. The inquiry here is "whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action . . . so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."2' 4
A good example of the application of this test is Milonas v.
Williams. 25 The plaintiffs, former students of a school for youtha
with behavior problems, brought an action against the school on
the ground that it had used a "behavior modification" program
that allegedly violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that the school administrators, acting under
color of state law, had caused them to be subjected to antitherapeutic and inhumane treatment, resulting in violations of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The unanimous panel of the court of appeals found state action, because "the state ha[d] so insinuated itself with the [school]
'2
as to be considered a joint participant in the offending actions.
The court made this determination after considering the following
23. Id. at 703; see also Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983) (private physician hired by county to perform autopsies was acting under color of state law); Morrison v.
Washington County, 700 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.) (refusing to dismiss physician employed by
county from section 1983 action), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Perez v. Sugarman, 499
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding state action for private institution's acts where the City of
New York had removed a child from the mother's custody and placed the child in a private
child-care institution); compare Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984) (no state
action found where private doctor had no supervisory or custodial functions, whose function
and obligation was solely to cure orthopedic problems, and who was not dependent on the
state for funds), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2667 (1985).
24. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
25. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
26. Id. at 940.
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factors: many of the plaintiffs had been placed at the school involuntarily by juvenile courts and other state agencies acting alone or
with the consent of the parents; detailed contracts were drawn up
by the school administrators and agreed to by many local school
districts that placed boys at the school; there was significant state
funding of tuition; and there was extensive state regulation of the
educational program at the school. These facts "demonstrate[d]
that there was a sufficiently close nexus between the state sending
boys to the school and the conduct of the school authorities so as
to support a claim under Section 1983. " 27
Application of the close-nexus test to the private-prison context should yield the same result, especially considering, among
other factors, the involuntary nature of the confinement, the detailed nature of the contracts between the government and the private entities, the level of government funding,2 8 and the extent of
state regulation of policies and programs.2 9
State-compulsion test. Like the public-function test and the
close-nexus test, the state-compulsion test can also result in improper state action, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inquiry is
whether the state had a clear duty to provide the services in
question.
In Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center,30 for example,
the plaintiff-a mentally retarded person who was a resident of a
state institution that had contracted with a private organization
for medical services-sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he
had been denied adequate medical care, that he had been subjected to inappropriate medical treatment, and that his property
had been improperly managed. The defendants contended that,
because the private organization that provided all of the medical
care about which the plaintiff complained was a private entity, the
27. Id.; see also Woodall v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(finding
sufficient nexus between private food corporation and state to constitute state action); Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (W.D. Ky. 1980)(finding

sufficient nexus between private residential-treatment center and state), aff'd, 674 F.2d 582
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982); compare Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861, 863-

64 (4th Cir. 1984)(finding insufficent nexus between private doctor and state on the particular facts), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2667 (1985).

28. On the question of the private entity's dependence on the state for funds, see
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841
(1982).
29. On the question of whether the particular function is subject to extensive state
regulation, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1007-08, 1009-10 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.

Kohn, 547 U.S. 830, 841 (1982).
30.

556 F. Supp. 677 (D. Mass. 1983).
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state could not be held accountable for the acts of the private corporation and, further, that the corporation could not be held responsible for not conforming with constitutional and statutory requirements that are applicable only to governmental entities. In
short, the issue was "whether the acts and omissions of the [private entity] constitute[d] state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether [it] acted 'under color of law' for
the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. '' 31
The court responded to these questions in the affirmative,
stating that "[t]he critical factor in our decision is the duty of the
state to provide adequate medical services to those whose personal
freedom is restricted because they reside in state institutions." 2
The court added:
[I]t would be an empty formalism to treat the [private entity] as anything
but the equivalent of a governmental agency for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Whether the physician is directly on the state payroll ... or paid indirectly by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the trilateral relationship
among the state, the private defendant, and the plaintiff. Because the state
bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to plaintiff,
because the state delegated that function to the [private corporation], and
because [that corporation] voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract,
[the private entity] must be considered to have acted under color of law, and
its acts and omissions must be considered actions of the state. For if [the
private entity] were not held so responsible, the state could avoid its constitutional obligations simply by delegating governmental functions to private
entities. 33

The foregoing statement virtually summarizes the experiences
of the courts on the questeion of whether the acts of private entities performing functions that are delegated by the state constitute
state action. In the context of detention-whether in a prison, a
jail, an immigration facility, a juvenile facility, or a mental-health
center-the answer is clearly affirmative.
Delegation. In Ancata v. Prison Health Services34-which involved the contracting out by the county of the provision of medical care to incarcerated individuals-the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently stated:
Although [the private entity] has contracted to perform an obligation owed
by the county, the county itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the policies or customs of the [private entity]. In that sense,
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 678.
Id.
Id. at 680.
769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985).
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the county's duty is non-delegable.3 5

In other words, there is an area of overlap between state action and the propriety of a delegation of governmental powers:
Government liability cannot be reduced or eliminated by delegating the governmental function to a private entity. But the non-

delegation doctrine goes further than that, holding that some governmental functions may not be delegated at all. Whether the
privatization of corrections would be held invalid under that doctrine is debatable; certainly the answer to that question is less
clear than is the answer to the question whether such a delegation
constitutes state action.
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ....
"-8
Strictly interpreted, this clause prohibits Congress from delegating
its legislative powers to any other institution.3 7 Due to societal
changes, advances,and complexities, however, a strict adherence to
the doctrine of non-delegation is not possible.3 8 Practicality necessitates that many of the comprehensive regulations that are required by modern life be delegated, for they are often too intricate
and detailed for the direct legislative process. Thus, Congress-under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution39 -can "delegate authority . . sufficient to effect its purposes. ' 40 But which purposes? Can the governmental functions of
incarcerating, punishing, deterring, and rehabilitating criminals
constitutionally be delegated to private entities?
Historically, the Supreme Court expressed an antipathy to the
delegation of policymaking responsibility to private organizations. 41 Although it has been suggested that the continued vitality
of this position is suspect, 42 as the doctrine has not been employed
to invalidate a delegation in more than 50 years (with similar experience in many states),' s the doctrine at the least retains important
35. Id. at 705.
36. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
37. See Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.4 (3d ed. 1972).
38. See Schwartz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1 (2d ed. 1984).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
40. E.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 748 (1948).
41. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); see
also Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
42. See, e.g., FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see also Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-18, at 291
(1978).

43. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
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influence by requiring that Congress provide an articulation of policy along with any delegation of authority. This requirement not
only limits agency excesses, but it also facilitates the practicality of
judicial review of agency action." Nevertheless, it may be that,
with a sufficiently broad delegation of a traditionally exclusive governmental function, the doctrine might be used once again.
In many areas, the courts have regularly allowed private entities to exercise authority that could be characterized as amounting
to a deprivation of a property or liberty interest.45 The area of
family law provides a familiar example."' And it is also true that,
even in areas that are traditionally thought of as belonging in the
realm of public rather than private decisionmaking, courts have
tolerated broad delegation of lawmaking power to private bodies. 7
There comes a point, however, where concerns about the fairness of decisionmaking that affects the interests of individuals in
what is so clearly a governmental function must outweigh the need
for unchanneled exercises of expertise and claims of efficiency and
reduced cost.4 Whether that point is reached with privatization of
corrections is a very difficult question, without any good, clear, recent help from the caselaw. Even if such a delegation is constitutional, however, that does not necessarily mean that it is wise to
transfer this most basic function of government-the doing of justice-to private hands.4 9
OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

Although there has been litigation on some of the issues that
are likely to be raised concerning the privatization of corrections,
the concept has yet to be fully tested, for there are presently no
primary medium-or maximum-security adult facilities in the. country that are owned or operated by private bodies.
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
44. See American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 106 (1946). "The delegation doctrine is alive, but not well articulated or coherently applied by the Supreme Court."
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Some Substance?, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1289 (1985). See generally Comment, The Fourth Branch: Reviving the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 619; Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REv. 257 (1982).
45. See generally Note, The State Courts and the Delegation of Public Authority to
Private Groups, 67 H~Av. L. REV. 1398, 1399 (1954).
46. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Todd & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
48. See Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201 (1937).
49. See infra nn. 51-53 and accompanying text.
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Such adult correctional facilities are different from juvenile,
immigration, work-release, and halfway-house facilities. Juvenile
facilities, for example, typically require only minimum security,
while adult institutions can range from minimum to maximum security. As a result, higher costs for security may be incurred by the
private contractor. As the security level increases, so too will concern for escapes, assaults, and prison discipline. Moreover, the special problems of long-term confinement must be considered, for the
length of imprisonment in an adult facility is certain to be much
longer than the length of stay in a juvenile, detention, or INS facility. Further, the political climate surrounding an adult facility will
usually involve stronger public opposition, since the inmates will
pose more of a threat to the immediate community. This opposition could delay, as well as increase the cost of, plans to contract
with the private sector. For these reasons and others, notwithstanding the claims of proponents of privatization, it may be that
lower cost is not an advantage of privatization for adult primary
institutions.5 0
If the concept of privatization of corrections does take hold,
however, we should move slowly and cautiously, for statutes may
have to be amended or repealed, and comprehensive contracts will
have to be drafted narrowly and unambiguously. Among the many
questions, both general and specific, that will have to be confronted are the following:
What standards will govern the operation of the institution?
Who will monitor the implementation of the standards?
Will the public still have access to the facility?
What recourse will members of the public have if they do not
approve of how the institution is operated?
50. See, e.g., NEW YORK TIMES, May 21, 1985, at A14 (reporting $200,000 in cost overruns for privately operated prison in Tennessee); see also American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, POSITION ON CONTRACTING OUT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
(July 1985). Kenneth F. Schoen, former Commissioner of Corrections in Minnesota, has
stated: "Private operators claim they can build prisons more cheaply. While more efficient
administration of construction may reduce costs, the savings are lost to the higher cost of
private borrowing, a against public bonds. And, since prison construction is financed
through tax shelters, the effect is to narrow the national tax base, shifting the burden of
financing jails to our lower-income taxpayers." Schoen, Private Prison Operators, NEW
YORK TIMES, Mar. 28, 1985, at A31.
Further, privatization of prisons and jails may cost the government more than public
ownership and operation of the faciliites would cost because, by delegating the incarceration
function, the state may waive the defense of sovereign immunity in ordinary-negligence actions. See Opinion Letter from W.J. Michael Cody, Tennessee Attorney General, to Shelby
A. Rhinehart, Tennessee State Representative, at 2, 10-11 (Nov. 27, 1985).
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Who will be responsible for maintaining security and using
force at the institution?
Who will be responsible for maintaining security if the private
personnel go on strike?
Where will the responsibility for prison disciplinary procedures lie? For example, will private personnel be permitted involvement in quasi-judicial decisions, including not only questions
concerning good-time credit, but also recommendations to parole
boards?
Will the company be able to refuse to accept certain inmates-such as those who have contracted AIDS?
What options will be available to the government if the corporation substantially raises its fees?
What safeguards will prevent a private contractor from making a low initial bid to obtain a contract, then raising the price
after the government is no longer immediately able to reassume
the task of operating the prisons (for example, due to a lack of
adequately trained personnel)?
What will happen if the company declares bankruptcy (for example, because of liability arising from a prison riot), or simply
goes out of business because there is not enough profit?
What safeguards will prevent private vendors, after gaining a
foothold in the corrections field, from lobbying for philosophical
changes for their greater profit?
Questions like these present some hard choices-but ones that
will have to be addressed if we should seriously move toward the
private ownership and operation of correctional institutions.
SYMBOLISM: THE HIDDEN ISSUE

In its 1985 policy statement on privatizaiton, the American
Correctional Association began: "Government has the ultimate authority and responsibility for corrections. '5 1 This should be undeniable. When it enters a judgment of conviction and imposes a sentence, a court exercises its authority, both actually and
symbolically. Does it weaken that authority, however-as well as
the integrity of a system of justice- when an inmate looks at his
keeper's uniform and, instead of encountering an emblem that
reads "Federal Bureau of Prisons" or "State Department of Corrections," he faces one that says "Acme Corrections Company"?
51. American Correctional Association,
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS

NATIONAL CORRECTIONAL POLICY ON PRIVATE

(Jan. 1985).
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DEFINING THE ISSUES

This symbolic question may be the most difficult policy issue
of all for privatization: Who should operate our prisons and
jails-apart from questions of cost, apart from questions of efficiency, apart from questions of liability, and assuming that prisoners and detainees will retain no fewer rights and privileges than
they had before the transfer to private management? In an important sense, this is really part of the constitutional-delegation issue,
in that it could be argued that virtually anything that is done in a
total, secure institution by the government or its designee is an
expression of government policy, and therefore should not be delegated.5 2 I cannot help but wonder what Dostoevsky-who wrote
that "[t]he degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons "53-would have thought about privatization of
corrections.
Further, just as the prisoner should perhaps be obliged to
know-day by day, minute by minute-that he is in the custody of
the state, perhaps too the state should be obliged to know-also
day by day, minute by minute-that it alone is its brother's
keeper, even with all of its flaws. To expect any less of the criminal-justice system may simply be misguided.
CONCLUSION

We should not be swayed by brash claims, such as the one by
a private-facility owner who told a New York Times reporter: "I
offer to forfeit my contracts if the recidivism rate is more than 40
percent. '54 Nor should we be fooled by the "halo effect"-that is,
that the first few major experiments will be temporarily attractive
because the private administrators, being observed very closely,
will be under great pressure to perform. Prison operation is not a
short-term business. We should further be wary that private-corrections corporations may initiate advertising campaigns to make
52. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936): "The power conferred upon the
majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is
legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or
an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business." Id. at 311.
As the executive director of the Vera Institute recently stated: "Justice is not a service,
it's a condition, an idea." NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 17, 1985, at A17 (statement of Michael E.
Smith). This theme is echoed by the president of the Police Foundation: "Being efficient
does not mean that justice will be served." Id. (statement of Hubert Williams).
53. Dostoevsky, THE HousE OF THE DEAD 76 (C. Garnett trans. 1957).
54. NEW YORK TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1985, at B6 (statement of Ted Nissen, president of
Behavior Systems Southwest).
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the public feel more fearful of crime than it already is, in order to
fill the prisons and jails. Finally, and most importantly, we should
not permit the purported benefits of prison privatization to thwart,
in the name of convenience, consideration of the broader, and
more difficult, problems of criminal justice.
To be sure, something must be done about the sordid state of
our nation's prisons and jails. The urgency of the need, however,
should not interfere with the caution that must accompany a decision to delegate to private companies one of government's most basic responsibilities-controlling the lives and living conditions of
those whose freedom has been taken in the name of the government and the people. At the least, the debate over privatization of
corrections may provide an incentive for government to perform its
incarceration function better.
Referring to privatization, the Director of the National Institute of Justice recently stated: "[W]hen we have opportunities to
do things more efficiently and more flexibly without in any way
harming the public interest, we would be foolish not to explore
them to the fullest." 55 What the public interest is, however, and
where day-to-day government power should reside, are questions
that are too important to leave only to criminal-justice professionals and academics. Whatever direction we may take on privatization, we must generate a thoughtful and deliberate review of the
complex issues that are involved, for resolution of these issues will
say a great deal about how we, as a society, wish to be perceived.
To rush toward privatization, therefore, is clearly inappropriate.

55. 16 CORRECTIONS DIG. 2 (1985) (statement of James K. Stewart).

